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The outsourcing of the manufacturing process of integrated circuits to fabrications plants
all over the world has exposed these chips to several security threats, especially at the
hardware level. There have been instances of malicious circuitry, such as backdoors, being
added to circuits without the knowledge of the chip designers or vendors. Such threats could
be immensely powerful and dangerous against conﬁdentiality, among other vulnerabilities.
Defense mechanisms against such attacks have been probed and defense techniques have
been developed. But with the passage of time, attack techniques have improved immensely
as well. From directly observing the inputs or outputs, adversaries have tried, on multiple
occasions, to extract data through other channels of data leakage, such as power, electro-
magnetic radiation and frequency, and have been very successful in doing so. This thesis
investigates one such attack, known as hardware Trojan, where a ring oscillator is used as
part of the Trojan to leak information regarding the logic value present at an internal circuit
site through the frequency analysis of the power trace.
This thesis thus aims to expose a vulnerability of circuits, and also proposes a design
technique to obfuscate the power trace to protect circuits against this kind of hardware
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Integrated Circuits (ICs) are comparable to the brain when talking about most modern
electronics systems. The creation of chips/ICs is a very large industry, and current demands
for ICs require that they be mass-produced. Because chips are constantly increasing in
complexity and size, the cost for designing and manufacturing chips is very high, and it would
be very diﬃcult for a single company to create them fully on their own [6]. Globalization,
teamed with cost-eﬀectiveness has led to various processes in the semiconductor industry,
especially manufacturing, being outsourced to diﬀerent countries all over the globe. Although
economically viable, this level of outsourcing has led to the decentralization of control over
the third-party facilities, thus exposing the ICs to several potential security threats.
The threat to hardware security is manifold. It could range from manipulating the cir-
cuitry to cause minor bit-ﬂips in a mass-produced general-purpose IC, to leaking extremely
sensitive data or causing military chips to malfunction during critical operations. For in-
stance, researchers Sergei Skorobogatov and Christopher Woods detected a backdoor in
the Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 chips, which were at the time used as military-grade Field-
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). The backdoor would give the adversary access to the
chip's conﬁguration data and unencrypted bitstream, and would enable him to modify low-
level silicon features or permanently damage the device [7].
Hardware security threats are usually classiﬁed as belonging to one of ﬁve categories.
These include hardware trojans [3], side-channel attacks (SCA) [8], counterfeit chips [9],
reverse-engineering, and IP piracy [10] [11]. If an adversary tries to obtain information on
the processes taking place within a chip without destroying it, they would most likely inject
a hardware Trojan horse or employ side-channel attacks. A Hardware Trojan Horse (HTH)
is any threat to an IC's security through malicious modiﬁcation of the original circuit [2].
Although it might be more likely that malicious modiﬁcations in ICs could be made at third-
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party manufacturing facilities, it important to know that oﬀshore semiconductor fabrication
plants may not be the only threat to hardware security. An HTH may be inserted into an
IC at one or more of the design stages, such as speciﬁcation, Register-Transfer Level (RTL),
layout, or fabrication [12]. This thesis investigates how a particular type of hardware Trojan
horse may successfully leak information about a chip. In particular, we investigate a ring
oscillator-based Trojan designed to leak information regarding the logic value at a circuit
site through the circuit's power trace.
Even when Trojans are not employed, it is possible to deduce information about circuit
operation by measuring and recording the power trace. Because encryption circuits are
particularly vulnerable to such attacks, several countermeasures have been employed to
protect them. One of the major SCA threats to encryption circuits is through the Diﬀerential
Power Analysis (DPA) attack, and there have been many publications that discuss how to
protect circuits from such attacks. These countermeasures are of two main categories. The
ﬁrst kind tries to make the power consumption equal throughout the power trace, thus
making the power consumption independent of intermediate operations and data values.
The second kind tries to obscure the power consumption by introducing extra gates for
additional switching activity, thus providing the attacker with false information on the power
consumption.
Although DPA-mitigation techniques work quite well, none of them are perfect, as the
resulting power trace generally is not completely independent of intermediate data values or
operations in the circuit.
This thesis is an attempt to analyze the vulnerability of circuits when more than one kind
of attack on hardware security may be implemented. This is achieved by implementing a
DPA-mitigation technique, after which the circuit is then subject to a power-based hardware
Trojan attack. We will show that the proposed Trojan can leak information even in the
presence of a selected DPA countermeasure. Thus, this thesis also proposes a protection
mechanism against this kind of Trojan attack.
2
1.1 Contribution
For preventing the leakage of side-channel information through the power trace for a ring
oscillator-based HTH, the frequency of switching needs to be obscured or indecipherable. In
this thesis, the vulnerability of circuits to frequency analysis of power side-channel attacks
is highlighted by the implementation of the HTH in benchmark circuits. The eﬀects of the
ring oscillator's chain length are also investigated.
To counter the frequency analysis attack, a method of obscuring the frequency is sug-
gested. By the usage of a technique proposed in this thesis, information on logic values at
an internal circuit point will be obscured even in the presence of frequency analysis of the
power trace. The functionality and eﬃcacy of this technique are veriﬁed by implementing it
in the benchmark circuits, and by performing frequency analysis.
1.2 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background on hardware
Trojan horses, and discusses the techniques used for Trojan detection. Chapter 3 explains
in detail how diﬀerential power analysis attacks work and also provides an overview of the
mitigation techniques. Chapter 4 talks about the experimentation setup, as well as the results
obtained. This chapter also proposes a novel technique for obscuring the power trace as a
countermeasure for an information-leaking ring oscillator-based hardware Trojan. Chapter 5




Background on Hardware Trojans
This chapter introduces the concept of hardware Trojan horses and investigates how
HTHs can be a major threat to integrated circuits. Some techniques for HTH detection are
also discussed, and the design of the HTH used in this thesis is shown.
2.1 Hardware Trojan Horse
The chip design and manufacturing process, as shown in Fig 2.1, is fragmented and is
spread out across the globe [8]. Because it is so spread out, the entire process is decentralized,
with the vendors having little actual control. In recent years, there have been several accounts
of incidents involving adversaries attempting to attack either the functionality of a chip, or
create a backdoor to it. The Syrian nuclear bombing is one such example. In 2007, state-of-
the-art Syrian radars failed to detect an incoming Israeli airstrike. Further probe concluded
that the reason for the failure in their detection system was the result of a backdoor that was
created in one of the system's chips [13] [14]. Such kinds of invasions at the hardware level
are known as hardware Trojan attacks, and chips may be susceptible to hardware Trojan
insertion at one or more levels of the design and manufacturing ﬂow shown in Fig 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Chip design and development [1]
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A Hardware Trojan Horse (HTH) is any malicious addition to or modiﬁcation of a cir-
cuitry or hardware system. As mentioned previously, this malicious addition or modiﬁcation
could be of any kind, ranging from introducing a minor fault in the circuit, to causing the
failure of critical operations in the circuit. Because hardware Trojans can be of many kinds,
and there is no single solution for detecting or preventing against all the diﬀerent types
of HTHs, a metric of classiﬁcation had to be developed for the application of appropriate
protection or detection mechanisms. In 2010, Wang et al. introduced a detailed taxonomy
for the classiﬁcation of HTHs based on their physical, activation, and action characteristics,
and this taxonomy is as shown in Fig 2.2 [2] [15].
Figure 2.2: Hardware Trojan taxonomy [2]
In Fig 2.2, "physical characteristics" refers to how the physical characteristics of the HTH
may be manifested at the hardware level. Activation characteristics refers to the criteria
under which the HTH may be activated to carry out its malicious functionality, and action
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characteristics refers to the malicious functionality of the HTH. Although the categories are
clearly deﬁned, an HTH may be classiﬁed under more than one category.
2.2 Hardware Trojan Implementation
The HTH implemented in this thesis is designed with consideration for the HTH structure.
The general structure of an HTH is as outlined in Fig 2.3. Most HTHs consists of a trigger
and a driver/payload [3]. It must be noted that although a lot of hardware Trojans may
follow the general structure, not all Trojans may be structured so. In fact, some HTHs may
additionally contain storage, as classiﬁed by Alkabani and Koushanfar [16], and the payload
need not always be connected with a circuit signal S.
The trigger is made up of the circuitry that would activate/deactivate the HTH un-
der speciﬁc criteria, depending on its mode of operation. The driver/payload is made of
the circuitry that would perform the malicious operation of the HTH (bit-ﬂip, leakage of
information, etc.).
Figure 2.3: General structure of a hardware Trojan horse [3]
For designing the payload for the HTH, the eﬀects of the HTH need to be taken into
consideration. The HTH must not be observable in the power trace as changes in the power
trace may be observed, especially when compared with the power trace of a "golden" circuit.
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If the eﬀects of the HTH are visible in the power trace, that could cause the circuit to fail
during manufacturing tests. To make sure that the HTH goes undetected, the Trojan trigger
should be such that it causes switching only under the conditions that are unlikely to be
seen during test, and the Trojan payload must be such that there is no switching when the
trigger is not activated. It is well-known that ring oscillators may be used as part of a HTH
in a chip. Traditionally, ring oscillator-based HTH have been used to destroy infected chips
by raising their core temperature [17].
In this thesis, we investigate a particular type of hardware Trojan that includes a ring
oscillator (RO) in the payload. The ring oscillator is used here to leak information from the
chip rather than destroy it.
Figure 2.4: Idea for the HTH
The design for the HTH used in this thesis is shown in Fig 2.4. The HTH leaks information
about a point P by enabling its logic state to be observed more clearly in the power trace.
When the Trojan trigger is enabled and the point P is at a logic high value, the ring oscillator
is enabled. Because the ring oscillator oscillates at a high frequency, usually higher than the
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frequency of the clock, the behavior of the ring oscillator can be observed clearly with the
appropriate tools. The oscillations of the ring oscillator would indicate that the point P
being observed, as well as the trojan trigger, are at a logic high. This kind of HTH can
hence be used for easy extraction of data, such as values that could help extract the secret
key otherwise spy on the chip.
2.3 Hardware Trojan Detection
Over the years, several techniques have been implemented for protection against of various
kinds of HTHs. These techniques, as shown in Fig 2.5, were brieﬂy classiﬁed into three main
categories by Xiao et al. as "Trojan Detection", "Design for Trust" and "Split Manufacturing
for Trust" [18].
Figure 2.5: HTH countermeasures
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2.3.1 Trojan Detection
Trojan detection refers to direct methods used for HTH detection without supplementary
circuitry. It is either performed at the pre-silicon (design) level or at the post-silicon (post
fabrication) level.
2.3.1.1 Pre-Silicon Trojan Detection
To detect the presence of HTHs, several researchers have employed functional validation
as a detection technique by employing random and constrained-random test vectors. Func-
tional validation is the technique used to conﬁrm the functional correctness of the circuit
by checking the logic value at the output pins [19] [20]. Other techniques look at toggle
coverage to identify suspicious nodes, and in come cases try formal veriﬁcation [21] [?].
2.3.1.2 Post-Silicon Trojan Detection
Post-silicon Trojan detection is classiﬁed as either destructive or non-destructive. For
post-silicon Trojan detection, destructive techniques are not generally used because of the
following two reasons:
1. Although malicious modiﬁcations in the ICs may be more detectable using this method,
it would normally take several weeks, to a couple of months for this process.
2. In the end, the IC will be rendered unusable and because the malicious modiﬁcation
may not exist in all of the fabricated ICs, the information obtained from this destructive
approach will only be relevant as a single sample.
As for the non-destructive approaches, functional test refers to using test patterns to
detect faults in a circuit. Although functional tests are not directly used to detect HTHs,
some of the patterns generated for functional test may trigger the Trojan, and hence activate
its mechanism during the test phase. However, an attacker will generally design a Trojan
that will be unlikely to be caught using functional test. Structural tests, such as those
generated with Automatic Test Pattern Generator (ATPG) tools may also detect Trojans,
but once again, an attacker can try to design a Trojan to avoid likely detection with this
approach.
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The other non-destructive approach, side-channel signal analysis, consists of several dif-
ferent types of Trojan detection approaches. Side-channel analysis has been proven to be
especially eﬀective at detecting HTHs by analysis of delay [22], transient power [23], and cur-
rent [24]. Side channel analysis is generally more eﬀective than logic test-based approaches
because even inactive Trojans may have a side channel eﬀect.
2.3.2 Design for Trust
Design for trust (DFTr) refers to the techniques that can be implemented to protect
circuits against the insertion of hardware Trojans and facilitate Trojan detection at the
same time. Such techniques may rely on making modiﬁcations to the IC design ﬂow. DFTr
usually comprises three techniques: logic encryption/obfuscation for hiding functionality, IC
camouﬂaging to prevent reverse-engineering through layout, and hardware Trojan activation,
usually through test patterns [25] [26].
2.3.3 Split Manufacturing for Trust
Split manufacturing for Trust was a technique suggested by leading fabless semiconductor
companies, and it refers to the splitting of the manufacturing process into sub-processes,
which may be performed at diﬀerent trusted or untrusted facilities. In Split Manufacturing
for Trust, the layout is split into two layers, namely Front End Of Line (FEOL) and Back
End Of Line (BEOL) based on which metal layers are used for implementation. The FEOL
layer consists of transistors and the lower metal layers and may be fabricated at an untrusted
foundry. The BEOL layer consists of the higher metal layers and are fabricated at a trusted
foundry. After fabrication, the two wafers are then aligned and integrated together. Because
the untrusted foundry will have no information on the BEOL layer, the process of split
manufacturing is considered to be very secure [27].
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Chapter 3
Power Analysis Attack and Mitigation
This chapter elaborates upon a (encryption) circuit's protection mechanisms by intro-
ducing a well-known threat, known as a Side Channel Attack (SCA) [4]. The Trojan design
for this thesis will then be tested against the circuit's protection mechanism.
When talking about electronic circuits, an unsophisticated attacker may assume that
data can only be leaked through the output pins of a chip as this is what makes up the most
basic and direct type of attack. But with the passage of time, adversaries have come up with
several new attack techniques. One such technique is called a Side Channel Attack (SCA).
Apart from the output pins, a circuit may also leak information through other physical
characteristics. In hardware security, a side-channel attack is an attack that takes advantage
of information gained through analysis of the physical measurements that are related to a
circuit's operation and implementation characteristics [8]. There are several diﬀerent types
of side channel attacks, as outlined in Fig 3.1 [4]. They are broadly classiﬁed under there
following categories:
1. Power monitoring attack
2. Timing attack
3. Electromagnetic attack
4. Diﬀerential fault analysis attack
5. Acoustic cryptanalysis attack.
Amongst all of these side-channel attacks, the power monitoring attack will be discussed
in detail for the purpose of this thesis as it is one of the most common attacks. A power
monitoring attack is a type of side-channel attack, wherein the attackers extract crucial
11
Figure 3.1: Cryptographic model including side-channel eﬀects [4]
information about a circuit's operation based on observation of the instantaneous power
consumption. This is made possible by the direct correlation between power consumption
and switching activity of logic gates and transistors within a digital circuit. To practically
measure a circuit's power consumption, a small resistor is inserted in series with the power
source. The current is obtained by calculating the potential diﬀerence between the two nodes
of the resistor. The power model for CMOS gates is given by Kocher et al [5] as:
Ptotal = Pswitching + Pshort−circuit + Pleakage
Here, the total power is the sum of dynamic power and leakage power, and the dynamic
power is the sum of switching power (Pswitch) and short-circuit power (Pshort−circuit). Pswitching
relates to the total switching activity in the circuit, i.e. transistor switching that would cause
the capacitor to get charged or discharged. The formula for Pswitching is given as [59]:
Pswitching = α.f.Ceff .V dd
2
Here, α = switching activity, f = switching frequency, Ceff = eﬀective capacitance, and
V dd = supply voltage. Here, α = 1 if the signal is a clock, and α is 1/2 if the signal switches
once per cycle.
Pshort−circuit refers to power consumption during an instantaneous short-circuit connection
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between the supply voltage and the ground at the time the gate switches state due to a brief
moment of simultaneous PMOS and NMOS switching. The equation for Pshort−circuit is given
as:
Pshort−circuit = Isc.V dd.f
where Isc = short-circuit current while switching, V dd = supply voltage and f = switching
frequency.
Pleakage is the static power consumption of the circuit. Static power is the baseline power
that may be consumed by the components of the circuit when there is no circuit activity.
The equation for Pleakage is given as
Pleakage = (Isub + Igate + Ijunct + Icontention)V dd
where Isub = subthreshold leakage current, Igate = gate leakage current, Ijunct = junction
leakage current, Icontention = contention current, and V dd = supply voltage.
When there is no switching activity in the circuit, only leakage power will be consumed.
When there is switching activity, dynamic power will also be consumed. As dynamic power
is driven by the switching activity (i.e. total # of gates switching), the total dynamic
power consumption during this period will be proportional to the switching of the gates.
Hence, coupled with basic knowledge of the circuit, analyzing the power trace could give
the adversary a signiﬁcant amount of information regarding what kind of operation is taking
place within the circuit.
There are two main kinds of power analysis attacks, both of which share the same prin-
ciple, but diﬀer in terms of purpose, complexity and method of execution. They are:
1) Simple power analysis (SPA) attacks
2) Diﬀerential power analysis (DPA) attacks.
Simple power analysis attacks were a commonly-used attack mechanism before the intro-
duction of DPA. The diﬀerential power analysis attack is the more commonly-used attack
method now, and employs SPA as the ﬁrst step. The two attacks are described in detail in
the following sections. Because these attacks are commonly applied to encryption circuits,
the discussion will focus on how these attacks may be used to extract an encryption key.
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3.1 Simple Power Analysis Attack
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks involve direct interpretation of the power trace to
reveal information about device operation during a single encryption/decryption operation.
As already note, this information can be used to deduce the secret key. Fig 3.2 shows the
current trace for a single 16-round encryption operation for a DES circuit from a typical
smart card. The 16 rounds of encryption are clearly visible by observing the 16 distinct
peaks in the trace [5].
Figure 3.2: Simple Power Analysis trace showing DES encryption rounds [5]
With SPA, it becomes possible for the attacker to extract a lot of information if they
have a high power oscilloscope and can zoom in to the power trace where encryption is
taking place. For example, zooming into encryption rounds 2 & 3 of Fig 3.2 results in Fig
3.3. Hence, more features are now visible by observing the power trace. For example, the
arrows in Fig 3.3 indicate rotation operations occurring once in round 2, and twice in round
3. Additionally, even more information about operations can be gained by observing the
power trace in greater resolution [5].
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Figure 3.3: Simple Power Analysis trace showing DES rounds 2 & 3 [5]
3.2 Diﬀerential Power Analysis Attack
With SPA, smaller values for variation in the power trace might mean the variations
get overshadowed by measurement errors and noise. To overcome this problem, Diﬀerential
Power Analysis (DPA) attacks are implemented by attackers. In DPA, statistical techniques
tailored to the target algorithm would be used over a large number of power traces to obtain
the correlation between instantaneous power consumption and the operations taking place
within the circuit. The beneﬁt of implementing DPA is that it is much more sophisticated
than SPA, and hence more diﬃcult to prevent.
According to S. Mangard et al., all DPA attacks, no matter how complex, follow a general
strategy. It consists of ﬁve steps, which are as follows [28] [29]:
1. Multiple power traces from encryption/decryption runs are gathered and related to
the corresponding value of d, where d is a known non-constant data value, usually the
plaintext. The result is stored as a vector di = (di,1, di,2, ..., di,D)
′, where D denotes
the total number of data blocks that are encrypted/decrypted and di denotes the data
value in the ith encryption/decryption run. The attacker also records the time period
corresponding to each run and this result is stored as a vector t
′
i = ti,1, ti,2, ..., ti,T . Here,
T denotes the length of the trace, and ti is the time value in the i
th encryption/decryp-
tion run. The traces can then be stored as a matrix T of size D x T . Because in DPA,
the diﬀerence function of the power traces is taken into consideration, it is crucial that
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the power traces for each of the runs are aligned correctly. This can either be done
using a trigger signal to enable the capture of the power traces by the oscilloscope, or
by using graphical techniques for alignment.
2. The intermediate result should be represented as a function f(d, k) where d is a known
non-constant data value, usually the known plaintext or generated ciphertext, and k
is a small part of the key.
3. Hypothetical intermediate values for every possible choice of k is calculated and repre-
sented as a vector of the form K = (k1, k2, ..., kN), where N denotes the total number
of possible choices for k. The elements of vector K are called key hypotheses. Hence,
with the key hypotheses K and known vector d, the adversary is able to calculate the
hypothetical intermediate values for all of the encryption runs and key hypotheses.
This calculation is used to create a matrix V of size D x N . Because the column
vectors for matrix V correspond to the key hypotheses, the goal of DPA is to ﬁnd out
which key hypothesis has been processed during the D runs. The corresponding key
hypothesis would then be the key.
4. The power consumption of the device is simulated for each hypothetical intermediate
value to obtain the hypothetical power consumption value. Here, matrix H is used
to denote instantaneous power consumption values. By mapping matrix V to H,
the attacker compares the hypothetical intermediate values to the hypothetical power
consumption values of each key value with the power trace at each position. The
power models usually employed to map V to H are the Hamming-distance and the
Hamming-weight models.
5. A matrix R of size N x T is now created. Here, R is the comparison of each column hi
of matrix H with each column tj of matrix T . This means that the adversary compares
the hypothetical power values with respect to each key value, with the recorded trace.
The comparison is usually performed by estimating the correlation coeﬃcient. For
higher values of ri,j, the values of matrix H and T map better. This means that, when
the value of the key is correct, a high correlation between the value of matrix T and
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corresponding value of matrix H will be obtained.
In DPA, because power consumption values obtained through many iterations of power
analysis are averaged out, the eﬀect of noise and measurement errors is reduced.
3.3 Countermeasures Against Power Analysis Attacks
Ever since Kocher et al. [5] proposed SPA and DPA attacks, several diﬀerent types of
countermeasures have been developed. Although diﬀerent in nature and functionality, they
usually follow one of the two main types of mitigation techniques [29]. These are listed as:
1. Hiding: This technique focuses on making the instantaneous power consumption in-
dependent of internal computations.
2. Masking: This technique focuses on obscuring the power trace in such a way that
the instantaneous power consumption would not be directly reﬂective of the circuit's
internal operations.
3.3.0.1 Masking
The masking countermeasure aims to make power consumption independent of the inter-
mediate values by randomizing the intermediate values being processed at the algorithmic
level. In masking, each intermediate value is concealed by an internally-generated random
value (mask) such that:
vm = v ∗m
Here, the ∗ operation usually depends on the operations involved in the cryptographic al-
gorithm. It usually represents EX-OR function (Boolean masking), modular addition (arith-
metic masking) or modular multiplication (arithmetic masking). The masks are usually
directly applied to the plaintext or key bits. Because the attacker does not have any infor-
mation on the value of the mask m, it becomes diﬃcult for the attacker to relate the power
consumption to what kind of operation is being performed.
3.3.0.2 Hiding
The hiding countermeasure aims to sever the link between intermediate values and power
consumption. There are two main approaches to this countermeasure:
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1. Randomize power consumption for each clock cycle
2. Equalize power consumption for all operations for each clock cycle
Although perfectly equalized power consumption or perfectly randomized power con-
sumption cannot be achieved in reality, the hiding techniques commonly used are quite
eﬀective.
To randomize power consumption, three main techniques are used, and they are listed
as follows:
1. Random insertion of dummy operations (Time Dimension)
2. Shuing (Time Dimension)
3. Increasing noise (Amplitude Dimension)
Equalization of power has only one category, and that would be to reduce the signal level.
At the cell-level, Dual-Rail Precharge (DRP) logic styles are used to counter DPA attacks
by making the power consumption of the cells independent of the processed data and the per-
formed operations. DRP logic styles focus on making power consumption equal throughout
all operations for each clock cycle by using Dual-Rail (DR) and precharge logic.
There are two main DRP logic styles. The ﬁrst logic style is called Sense Ampliﬁer
Based Logic (SABL), and the second logic style is called Wave Dynamic Diﬀerential Logic
(WDDL), which is a reﬁnement of a technique called Separated Dynamic Diﬀerential Logic
(SDDL).
In 2004, Tiri et al. [30] published the ﬁrst design methodology to use Diﬀerential Dynamic
Logic (DDL). The goal of DDL is to make power consumption independent of switching ac-
tivity. This is done by making either the switching activity constant, or the load capacitance
constant.
For this thesis, SDDL is used as the DPA-mitigation technique. The basic logic behind
SDDL is highlighted in Fig 3.4. Here, "n_prch" represents the Precharge signal, "n_A"
represents A¯, and "n_B" represents B¯.
The idea behind SDDL is that for every AND gate, there is a complimentary OR gate
that also provides switching when the AND gate does not. This leads to having at least one
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Figure 3.4: SDDL implementation of AND gate
switching activity per clock cycle. In case the inputs to the gates are repeated, there will
usually be no switching activity, which leads to the introduction of the precharge signal. The
precharge signal is connect to the second two AND gates. This means that if the precharge
signal is deasserted, i.e. in the precharge phase, the outputs of the precharge-controlled AND
gates will be forced to become logic 0, regardless of their previous state. When the precharge
signal is at logic 0, i.e. in the evaluation phase, the AND gates connected to Precharge will
be able to propagate the value at their other input terminal. This means that even if there
is no change in inputs for consecutive clock cycles, there will be some switching activity due
to the eﬀect of the Precharge signal.
For implementing SDDL in this thesis, the circuits C432 [31] and C499 [32] were syn-
thesized with only the basic AND, OR and INV gates, after which cell substitution was
performed in order to include the complimentary logic. This was performed using a Perl
script where for each AND/OR gate, the complimentary SDDL gates were added directly to




Chapters 2 and 3 provided background on the creation of hardware Trojans, counter-
measures against HTHs, and power analysis mitigation techniques. This chapter focuses
on the concurrent implementation of these techniques. For this purpose, the ISCAS HLM
benchmark circuits, C432 [31] and C499 [32], have been employed. For the DPA-mitigation
technique in our experiments, we are using SDDL for most of the analyses.
In out experiments, the hardware Trojan has been designed to be able to observe the
current logic value at a point P in the circuit. A DPA-mitigation technique (SDDL) is
applied to the circuit and the eﬃcacy of the HTH in leaking information is measured when
SDDL has been added. The goal is to determine whether DPA mitigation has an eﬀect on
the detectability or eﬃcacy of the HTH. Additionally, the proposed method for obfuscating
the frequency of switching in the power trace is also analyzed by implementing it against
the HTH.
4.1 Methodology
The simulation experiments included in this thesis followed the protocol below:
1. As part of the general setup, all the logic gates in the NanGate 45nm library [33] were
imported into Cadence Virtuoso [34].
2. Obtained Verilog code for the circuits from the ISCAS HLM website [35].
3. Modiﬁed the NanGate library to include only the basic 2-input AND, 2-input OR and
INV gates and created a database ﬁle for the new restricted library using Synopsys
Library Compiler [36] (A tutorial for this can be found at [37]).
4. Synthesized the Verilog for each circuit using modiﬁed NanGate 45nm library with
Synopsys Design Compiler [38] (A tutorial for this can be found at [39]).
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5. If a HTH or the proposed frequency obfuscation circuitry needed to be added to the
circuit, it was done post-synthesis and added directly to the synthesized Verilog. Ad-
ditionally, if SDDL needed to be added to the circuit, it was also done post-synthesis
through means of cell substitution using a Perl script.
6. A stimulus ﬁle was then created using Perl to provide the simulator with instantaneous
values for the logic inputs.
7. Timing analysis using Synopsys PrimeTime [40] was performed to ascertain that the
slack was non-negative. If the slack was negative, the time period between two subse-
quent input signals was increased and tested again until positive slack was obtained.
8. The synthesized Verilog ﬁle was then imported into Cadence Virtuoso and set up in the
ADE L environment [58] to automatically generate a SPICE netlist from the synthe-
sized Verilog schematic. The SPICE netlist will later be used for HSPICE simulation.
9. After the generation of the SPICE netlist, a Perl script was used to automatically
generate .MEASURE statements to calculate the average power every 10ps. These
.MEASURE statements were then added to the SPICE netlist.
10. SPICE simulation was then performed using Synopsys HSPICE [57]. This simulation
generated the ﬁles .mt0 and .tr0 (among others).
11. The .tr0 ﬁle contained information on the instantaneous logic values of all the nets in
the circuit. When opened with Synopsys WaveView [56], we could use the .tr0 ﬁle to
observe the instantaneous logic value of point P.
12. The .mt0 ﬁle contained the results of the .MEASURE statements. A Perl script was
written to parse the data in .mt0 ﬁle into .csv format. The graph of power vs time was
then plotted using LibreOﬃce [41].
13. For frequency analysis of the power trace, a Perl script was written to parse the x
(time) and y (power) values to .txt format.
14. A .m ﬁle was written to import the .txt ﬁles into MathWorks MATLAB [42] and ﬁlter
the signal using a high-pass ﬁlter.
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4.2 Hardware Trojan Trigger
The general structure of a Hardware Trojan Horse (HTH) was introduced in Ch 2. The
trigger circuit designed for this thesis shown in Fig 4.1. The payload of the HTH can
be triggered and untriggered based on the input patterns applied to the trigger circuit.
Considering an initial state of logic 0 for Q, if the trigger pattern is applied once, i.e. if
all the inputs are set to a logic 1, the D ﬂip-ﬂop (DFF) will toggle, causing Q to now hold
the logic value 1. If the trigger pattern is applied again on another clock cycle, the DFF
will toggle again, causing the value of Q to become logic 0. This toggling action will repeat
itself depending on how frequently the trigger pattern is applied. If the inputs to the Trojan
trigger are at a logic 1 for multiple clock cycles, the DFF will keep toggling. When Q is
holding the value of logic 1, the HTH payload is activated for the time that Q holds its value.
When Q toggles to a logic 0, the HTH payload is deactivated until Q toggles again.
Figure 4.1: Basic concept for trigger circuit
The beneﬁt of using this kind of trigger is that the triggering of the HTH can be controlled
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externally by the adversary.
The input signals shown in Fig 4.1 can be chosen by the adversary to be unlikely to be
activated during functional or structural test, and they could either be taken from Primary
Inputs (PIs) or from intermediate nodes. The beneﬁt of using PIs to activate the HTH is that
the adversary will have easy control over when the Trojan gets triggered and untriggered,
but this would also mean that there would be a higher chance of the HTH being activated
during test because PIs are perfectly controllable, when compared with nodes that are less
controllable. If the logic value from intermediate nodes are used as the input signals for
the Trojan trigger, the triggering of the HTH may be comparatively more diﬃcult for the
adversary to control because additional conditions may need to be satisﬁed at the primary
inputs to justify the logic values needed for the trigger. The beneﬁt of using intermediate
nodes though, is that it would be relatively more diﬃcult to trigger the HTH during test, but
this will depend on the controllability and the 1's probability of the intermediate nodes [43].
To simulate the Trojan trigger to measure its maximum and minimum power consump-
tion, we implemented the HTH trigger using the NanGate 45nm PDK library. The total
power consumption of the trigger circuit will vary with respect to the switching activity
within the trigger. The power consumption of the Trojan trigger with diﬀerent amounts of
switching activity is as shown in Fig 4.2. Here, the minimum power consumption is about
0.5mW. At about 118ns, for when all of the gates are switching, there will be maximum
switching activity and the power consumption will be approximately 2mW. This ﬁnding
implies that even if a single AND gate in the Trojan trigger is switching, there will be an
increase in the overall power consumption for that particular time period by about 0.5mW.
The determining factor for how easy or diﬃcult it may be for a test engineer to detect this
HTH by using power-based techniques would depend on the size of the original circuit and
the number of HTHs implanted. This is because if the adversary wishes to leak information
on multiple sites in the circuit, the adversary would require a modiﬁed trigger circuit for
each implementation of the HTH, which would thus cause additional switching activity and
hence cause additional power consumption. The percentage of total circuit's power that the
HTH would consume would depend on the size of the original circuit, thus making the HTH
less detectable in a larger circuit. Because DPA-mitigation techniques usually increase the
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Figure 4.2: Power trace of HTH trigger for multiple input combinations
number of cells in a circuit, the Trojan trigger would consume a lower percentage of total
power consumption in a circuit with DPA protection, hence making the detection of the
HTH comparatively more diﬃcult through power analysis in such a circuit.
Additionally, the probability of the HTH being set active during test will depend on
multiple factors. They could include the number of inputs the Trojan trigger contains, the
location at which the HTH is inserted, and the controllability of its inputs. For the trigger
circuit shown in Fig 4.1, the probability of the Trojan being triggered in isolation, considering
a 1's probability of 0.5, is: Pr = (0.5)
8. Therefore, Pr = 0.00390625, or 0.39%. Additionally,
the probability of triggering the HTH will be lower for a larger trigger pattern.
For the purpose of triggering the payload of the HTH, an always-on trigger was used for
all experimentation purposes. Here, the HTH is always enabled by adding a connection for
the power line in place of the trigger circuit. The payload in Fig 4.1 is directly connected to
the AND gate with the inputs VDD and Point P in this case. Doing this instead of creating
a trigger for the HTH will make the HTH vulnerable to detection as:
1. The HTH will leak information whenever the circuit is powered on. This means that the
malicious eﬀects of the HTH may be easily detected through power and/or frequency
analysis in the parametric test stages as the payload will be automatically enabled [44].
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2. If the adversary wishes to use the HTH to observe multiple points at multiple sites in
the circuit, it may not be possible for them to do so. If two or more RO-based HTHs
with "always-on" trigger are introduced to the circuit, the adversary will not be able
to view the eﬀects of each of the multiple ROs in isolation. This is because although
the eﬀect of the ROs may be visible through frequency analysis of the power trace, it
will be impossible to tell which RO was oscillating.
Because we have already analyzed the impact of the Trojan trigger on the power trace
in isolation, the rest of the thesis will be using an always-on trigger so that we can directly
analyze the eﬀect of the payload. Another reason for using an always-on trigger for experi-
mentation purposes is that it is possible for an adversary to use a diﬀerent kind of trigger,
but we are primarily interested in the behavior of the ring oscillator-based payload.
4.3 Trojan Payload
The payload for the HTH was introduced in Chapter 2. In this section, the attributes of
the payload, such as frequency and power consumption, will be analyzed.
Figure 4.3: Ring oscillator as HTH payload
A ring oscillator, as shown in Fig 4.3 is a combination of an odd number of inverting gates
that leads to constant switching activity in the circuit. For this purpose, a ring oscillator
would always be made up of an odd number of INVs or NANDs connected that form a ring.
Because ring oscillators provide high-frequency switching when activated, the eﬀects of the
ring oscillator may be observed directly from the power trace or by performing frequency
analysis on the power trace.
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Additionally, because ring oscillators are widely used in circuits for hardware trojan
detection, it may be possible for an adversary at the manufacturing level to modify the mask
of the circuit in such a way that portions of on-chip ring oscillators may be used for the
payload of the HTH. In this case, the HTH may be mistakenly considered to be a part of
the original circuit and may go undetected.
In this thesis, a ring oscillator has been used a the payload for the HTH. Because ring
oscillators are normally of two kinds, two HTH payloads have been implemented and ana-
lyzed. One implementation consists of an INV chain and the other implementation consists
of a NAND chain, along with an AND gate that enables/disables the HTH based on the
logic value of the trojan trigger. The gate-level schematic of the Trojan payload with an
inverter chain is as shown in in Fig 4.3.
4.3.1 Eﬀects of RO chain length and type
A ring oscillator chain can vary from a single INV/NAND gate to many INV/NAND
gates, provided that the number of inversions is odd. The implementations of an INV-based
RO and a NAND-based RO with chain size 3 are as shown in Fig 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.
In this section, the eﬀects of the size and type of ring oscillator are analyzed.
Figure 4.4: INV-based ring oscillator with chain length 3
4.3.2 Eﬀect on Power
The hardware trojan consists of a trigger and a payload, wherein the payload is the ring
oscillator circuit. In this experiment, we observe the eﬀect of RO chain length on the power
consumption by measuring the transient power of the ring oscillator payload through SPICE
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Figure 4.5: NAND-based ring oscillator with chain length 3
simulation. This experiment is performed to make conclusions on which type of RO would
be more/less detectable in the power trace. The result of the experiment is as shown below.
Fig 4.6 shows the power trace when a INV-based ring oscillator of chain size 7 is excited.
Figure 4.6: Power trace of INV-based RO with chain length of 7
Because a ring oscillator requires odd numbers of inverters, for a comparison in terms of
power consumption, we simulated ring oscillators with 3, 7, and 13 inverters, and 3, 7 and
13 NAND gates. All the ring oscillators are enabled, and we evaluated the eﬀect of size and
type of RO on the power trace.
The power consumption of an INV-based RO with chain size 3, 7 and 13 is as shown in
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Figure 4.7: Power trace of 3, 7 & 13 INV-based ROs
Fig 4.7, and that of a NAND-based RO with chain size 3, 7 and 13 is as shown in Fig 4.8.
Here, the legend is named according to the size and type of RO chain. For example, "7inv"
would represent a INV-based RO with a chain length of 7. The legends in both these graphs
are used to indicate diﬀerent chain types. From the graphs, there are two main observations
that can be made.
Firstly, the maximum power consumption for the INV-based ROs is approximately
0.513mW, regardless of chain length. In contrast, the maximum power consumption of
NAND-based ROs is approximately 0.7105mW.
Secondly, although the maximum power consumption may be the same, the 3 traces for
both the INV-based and the NAND-based ROs do not match exactly with respect to time.
This is because the chain size of the ROs determine at what point of time the main AND
gate that connects the rest of the RO to the trigger circuit, as shown in Fig 4.3, switches.
For example, in Fig 4.7 the power trace of the RO with an INV chain length of 7 has the
AND gate switch at about 140ns, after which it is followed by seven peaks at a power level
of 0.5mW that indicate each of the seven inverters switching. This is again followed by the
switching of the AND gate, which corresponds to maximum switching.
Hence, if an adversary tries to obtain data on whether or not the RO-based HTH is
enabled, they could perform frequency analysis on the power trace based on the individual
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Figure 4.8: Power trace of 3, 7 & 13 NAND-based ROs
frequency components as seen in Fig 4.7. In fact, each trace in Fig 4.7 and Fig 4.8 is made
up of multiple frequencies. This can be attributed to two factors. The ﬁrst factor is, as
mentioned before, the switching of the main AND gate. This is because, the longer the RO
chain, the more the time between two consecutive switching activities of the AND gate. The
second factor is that switching from logic 1 to logic 0 will consume a diﬀerent amount of
power compared to when switching from logic 0 to logic 1. It should however be noted that if
parasitic extraction was performed and the circuit was then modelled using real capacitance
values, the power trace of the ring oscillators may look more damped.
If an adversary tried to implement the RO as payload to the HTH, they may use an
INV-based RO instead of a NAND-based RO because of decreased power consumption.
This would mean that if the HTH is triggered, a NAND-based RO would be more visible
in the power trace when compared with an INV-based RO. Because one of the goals of this
thesis is to be able to extract data through frequency analysis of the power trace, the actual
power consumption of the RO-based HTH does not matter as much as long as we are able
to obtain correct data by using ﬁlters.
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4.4 Power Analysis
For this thesis, the two ISCAS circuits C432 [31] and C499 [32] are used. The DPA-
mitigation technique, SDDL, as well as the RO-based HTH, are implemented on these cir-
cuits. The circuits were ﬁrst synthesized to use the NanGate 45nm library. The synthesis
was performed to use only the AND, OR and INV gates as this would make implementing
SDDL easier. After synthesis, SDDL logic was added to the synthesized circuit through
cell substitution using Perl. This implies that for every synthesized AND gate, substitution
would add two more AND gates and one OR gate and make the gate connections accord-
ing to the SDDL circuit diagram. Accordingly, for every synthesized OR gate, substitution
would add two AND gates and one OR gate and make the gate connections according to the
SDDL circuit diagram.
An ideal implementation of SDDL should make the power consumption due to switching
activity equal throughout the power trace, regardless of the operation being performed.
However, due to the inclusion of duplicate inverted functions in our implementation of SDDL,
this ideal condition is not possible to achieve. This is because of the structure of SDDL,
where inverted outputs are formed by the inclusion of complementary gates (e.g. OR is
complementary to NAND). In order for SDDL to be optimized, any pre-existing inverted
functions should be replaced by inverted functions obtained through the implementation of
the relevant complementary gate. This, however, does not aﬀect or modify the eﬀect of the
HTH in any way.
4.4.1 Observation of Point P
As one of the goals of this thesis is to demonstrate that the logic value of any arbitrary
point P in the circuit can be extracted through frequency analysis of the power side-channel,
the RO-based HTH is implemented in C432 and C499. For this thesis, an arbitrary point in
each circuit was selected as point P. The HTH can be easily modiﬁed to be able to observe
any point in the circuit that the attacker desires by placing the HTH at that point in the
circuit.
During the experimentation process, the power consumption of four implementations of
the circuits are performed, and they are as follows:
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1. Original circuit
2. Original circuit with HTH activated
3. Original circuit with DPA-mitigation activated
4. Original circuit with DPA-mitigation and HTH activated
4.4.1.1 Circuit 1
Our ﬁrst circuit is C432. C432 is an ISCAS-85 combinational circuit that works as a
27-channel interrupt controller. It consists of four 9-bit inputs, 3 single-bit outputs and
one 4-bit output. The input sequence used was obtained from the ISCAS HLM webpage
for functional tests and it is such that C432 would have to perform various functions like
enabling or disabling interrupt requests based on the priority assigned to the ports [31].
Fig 4.9 shows the power trace for C432 without any modiﬁcations, and Fig 4.11 shows
the power trace of C432 without DPA-mitigation, but with the HTH inserted. In this case,
the eﬀect of the ring oscillator can be seen clearly from Fig 4.11 at intervals such as 150ns to
200ns, where there is increased power consumption in certain areas of the power trace where
there would ideally be no switching activity. This increase in power consumption is because
the HTH trigger is turned on, and the point P in C432 being observed is at a logic high.
This becomes very clear when the power trace of C432 with HTH enabled is compared with
the logic levels of point P (shown in Fig 4.10). The increased power consumption ranges
from 0.2mW to 0.5mW, and is in accordance with the power consumption we had measured
for the INV-based RO from Fig 4.6.
If the adversary is able to obtain the power trace but is not able to tell what the value
of point P at any given point of time is through the power trace directly, the adversary
can choose to ﬁlter out low-frequency signals from the power trace. For frequency analysis,
the instantaneous values for power consumption were imported into MATLAB, after which
the entire trace was passed through a High-Pass Filter (HPF). The HPF blocks the lower
frequencies, and allows only the high frequencies to pass. Because the RO is the only high-
frequency component in this circuit implementation, we can directly use an HPF instead of
a Band-Pass Filter (BPF). As a result, we obtained the high-pass ﬁltered trace as shown in
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Figure 4.9: Power trace of C432
Figure 4.10: Waveform of point P being observed in C432
Fig 4.12. The correlation between Fig 4.10 and Fig 4.12 can be seen clearly as the ﬁltered
signal oscillates whenever point P is at a logic high, throughout the trace.
To ascertain the logic values represented by the ﬁltered signal match with that of point
P, a bitstream of the logic value at every 4ns was created. The actual value of P shown in
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Figure 4.11: Power trace of C432 with HTH activated
Fig 4.10, has the following values:
1111111111111111001100111111111111001111111111111100000011001100
For point P being observed by the HTH inserted in C432, we choose to consider a logic
value of 0 for the ﬁrst 8ns as the circuit is still stabilizing here. The bitstream generated for
the same is:
0011111111111111001100111111111111001111111111111100000011001100
Both bitstreams are a perfect match for the entire time period other than the ﬁrst 8ns.
This would mean that if the circuit is not protected by any DPA-mitigation techniques, the
operation of the RO can be observed clearly through analysis of the power trace, given that
the adversary has the required high-precision instruments to obtain good data.
Fig 4.13 shows the power trace for C432 with SDDL implemented for DPA-mitigation.
Fig 4.14 shows the power trace of C432 with DPA-mitigation, and the HTH is enabled.
When comparing this power trace to that of C432 with DPA-mitigation but without HTH
enabled, the adversary may not always be able to tell when the RO is oscillating and when
it is not. Thus, an adversary may pass the signals through an HPF to obtain the graph in
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Figure 4.12: Frequency analysis of C432 with HTH activated
Fig. 4.15. The ﬁltered signal can be visually observed to be a good representation of the
point P that the HTH was leaking information on (Fig 4.10).
For the value of point P being observed by the HTH inserted in C432 with DPA-
mitigation, the bitstream generated has the following values:
1111111111111111001100111111111111001111111111111100000011001100
The value of the bitstream matches with the bitstream generated for point P 100% of the
time. This means that information on the value of point P is successfully being leaked by
the HTH.
The eﬀect of the ring oscillator can be seen in the power traces of Fig 4.13 and 4.14 due to
minor changes to the amount of power consumption. For example, for the time period of 5ns
to 50ns, the maximum amount of power consumption for the DPA-mitigated C432 with the
HTH is about 68mW, and the minimum amount of power consumption is about 1.655mW.
In contrast, for the time period of 5ns to 50ns, the minimum amount of power consumption
for DPA-mitigated C432 without the HTH is about 1.49mW. But it is important to note
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Figure 4.13: Power trace of C432 with SDDL implemented
that since this is a highly zoomed-in version of the trace, and since the diﬀerence in power
consumption is minor, this increase in power consumption might be treated as noise. Thus,
the HTH may or may not be detected during parametric test, considering that the HTH is
activated. The precision and range of the test equipment will also play a big role in whether
or not this HTH can be detected directly from the power trace.
In order to ascertain that point P can be observed by implementing this HTH, frequency
analysis was performed. For C432, the actual value of the point P is as shown in Fig 4.10.
The value of point P as deduced by frequency analysis is as shown in Fig 4.15. In this ﬁgure,
the thick blue line represents times when point P is at a logic 1. As can be seen from the
waveforms, we have successfully been able to observe the logic value of point P by passing
the power trace through a ﬁlter.
Once again, to ascertain whether the logic values represented by the ﬁltered signal in
Fig. 4.15 match the true value of point P, a bitstream of the logic value at every 4ns was




Figure 4.14: Power trace of C432 with SDDL and HTH activated
Figure 4.15: Frequency analysis of C432 with SDDL and HTH activated
This bitstream matches exactly with the bitstream for point P, thus implying that infor-
mation on point P can be successfully be leaked in C432 even when it employs SDDL as a
DPA-mitigation technique.
4.4.1.2 Circuit 2
The second circuit on which we experimented is C499. C499 is an ISCAS-85 combina-
tional 32-bit single-error-correcting circuit. It consists of one 32-bit input, one 8-bit input,
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one single-bit input and one 32-bit output. The input sequence used was obtained from the
ISCAS HLM webpage for functional tests [32].
Figure 4.16: Power trace of C499
Fig 4.16 shows the power trace of C499 without DPA-mitigation and without the HTH
activated. Fig 4.17 shows the logic values of the point P being observed by the HTH inserted
in C499 for the entire time period of simulation. Additionally, for analysis purposes, we assign
bit values for every 4ns in the trace for point P to be able to observe it closely and compare
it to the modiﬁed circuits. The bit value for point P is given as:
00000100000000000000000000001001111111111111111111111111111101111111111111111111111
Fig 4.18 shows the power trace of C499 without any DPA-mitigation, but with the HTH
activated. The eﬀects of the ring oscillator-based HTH may be visible to the attacker through
visual inspection as the power trace in Fig 4.18 clearly shows that the baseline power con-
sumption is raised by approximately 0.5mW when point P is equal to logic 1. Based on
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Figure 4.17: Waveform of point P being observed in C499
Figure 4.18: Power trace of C499 with HTH activated
visual analysis, the value of point P as leaked by the HTH is encoded in a bitstream as:
00000100000000000000000000001001111111111111111111111111111101111111111111111111111
The value of the two bitstreams match 100%, which means that the RO-based HTH
successfully leaks information on point P through the power trace. However, considering
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Figure 4.19: Frequency analysis of C499 with HTH activated
that the eﬀect of the ring oscillator may not be entirely clear through visual analysis, the
attacker may decide to use an HPF on the power trace to ﬁlter out all the low frequency
signals. The ﬁltered trace for C499 is as shown in Fig 4.19. From the trace, it becomes
very clear as to when we are able to observe the high frequency signals and when there are
no high frequency signals. The high-frequency signals here refer to the oscillation of the
ring oscillator, and when we assign logic values to the ﬁltered signal, we get the following
bitstream:
00000100000000000000000000001001111111111111111111111111111101111111111111111111111
When compared to the point P being observed by the HTH in C499, we can eﬀectively
say that information on point P is successfully leaked by using this HTH as the values of the
bitstream match completely with the bitstream generated for point P.
Fig 4.16 shows the power trace of the original C499 circuit and Fig 4.20 shows the power
trace of C499 with DPA-mitigation but without the HTH enabled, and Fig 4.21 shows the
power trace of C499 with DPA-mitigation as well as the HTH activated. In this case, the
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Figure 4.20: Power trace of C499 with SDDL implemented
eﬀect of the ring oscillator may not be completely visible by means of simple visual inspection.
Hence, an adversary may try to pass the trace through a high-pass ﬁlter to isolate the high
frequency signals and thus be able to identify when the ring oscillator is enabled and when
it is not. After passing the power trace through an HPF in MATLAB, the resultant signal
is as shown in Fig 4.22. Disregarding the background noise, an adversary may try to assign
logic values to the ﬁltered signal. On the basis of logic value for each time period (4ns), we
get the following bitstream:
00000100000000000000000000001001111111111111111111111111111101111111111111111111111
The value of the bitstream matches completely with the bitstream generated for point
P. Hence, we can conclude that the adversary is able to leak and observe the logic value of
point P by means of passing the power trace through an HPF and analyzing the resultant
graph.
Hence, this would mean that although the circuit may be protected by a DPA-mitigation
technique like SDDL, and although the eﬀects of the HTH may not be directly observable
from the power trace, the operation of the RO can be observed clearly by the adversary
through frequency analysis of the power trace, given that the adversary has the required
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Figure 4.21: Power trace of C499 with SDDL and HTH activated
high-precision instruments to obtain good data.
4.5 Frequency obfuscation
Because it appears to be possible to detect the information being leaked by the Trojan
horse even in the presence of SDDL, an additional circuit was developed to create additional
switching activity and mitigate the Trojan eﬀect. In this thesis, we are introducing a type of
frequency obfuscation technique which will prevent an attacker from obtaining leaked infor-
mation through frequency analysis of the power trace. This technique works by obfuscating
the power trace to such an extent that high-frequency information, relayed on the power
trace by constant and high-speed switching, cannot be leaked even if there is an elongation
of the clock period and/or an increase in the time interval used to apply new inputs. The
circuit design for the DPA-mitigation technique is as shown in Fig 4.23.
The circuit shown in Fig 4.23 comprises two MUXs, one NAND and one XOR gate, and
includes combinational feedback. The idea behind implementing this technique is that the
value of x_ns will keep toggling regardless of whether input x is in the same logic state as it
was previously or not. The value of x may correspond to a point in the circuit, an output of
a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) or any other desired signal. Multiple copies of this
obfuscation circuit may be added and attached to diﬀerent signals until the desired level of
41
Figure 4.22: Frequency analysis of C499 with SDDL and HTH activated
Figure 4.23: Implementation of DPA-mitigation
obfuscation has been reached. The truth table for this implementation is as shown in table
4.1.
Table 4.2 shows the switching activity for a single implementation of the proposed ob-
fuscation technique. It shows the total switching activity within the circuit when the inputs
change from one state to another for all of the input switching combinations. The three
input state changes that cause a switching activity of 4 are 11 to 10, 10 to 11, and 00 to 11.
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Table 4.1: Truth table for DPA-mitigation implementation





Table 4.2: Switching activity for state changes
x (Prev state) x_ns (Prev state) x (Next state) x_ns (Next state) Switching activity
1 1 1 0 4
1 1 0 0 5
1 0 1 1 4
1 0 0 1 6
0 1 1 0 6
0 1 0 0 6
0 0 0 1 6
0 0 1 1 4
Additionally, input state changes from 00 to 01, 01 to 10, 01 to 00, and 10 to 01 each cause
6 gates to switch. A change from 11 to 00 causes 5 gates to switch. Because the switching
activity is not equal for all state changes, the power consumption will also hence not be equal
for all the state changes. This means that if the adversary tried to manipulate the power
trace in a way such that they subtract the estimated power consumption of the Trojan from
the power consumption caused by the proposed obfuscation technique, they may still not
be able to tell when the HTH is enabled versus when it is not. Additionally, this kind of
comparative analysis on the side of the attacker may become even more diﬃcult if more than
one module of the proposed obfuscation technique is used.
Because the circuit for this obfuscation technique, as shown in Fig 4.23, has a combina-
tional feedback loop, the circuit will continue to switch even after other circuit transitions
have died out. This means that even if the ring oscillator-based Trojan is enabled while the
proposed frequency obfuscation technique is active, due to the superposition of two separate
frequencies in the overall power consumption, the adversary may ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to
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extract information on the observed point P even if they pass the power trace through a
bandpass ﬁlter. This is especially true because the number of gates switching due to the
presence of the RO-based Trojan is within the normal variability of switching gates for this
circuit.
Since this method is to be implemented by connecting "x" to wires and not gates, the
wires can be chosen randomly from multiple sites in the circuit. These wires can be inputs
or outputs to gates. The switching activity between the diﬀerent state changes may be
diﬀerent, as shown in Table 4.2, but because x_ns keeps changing, the switching activity
will be dynamic and more diﬃcult to predict for an attacker a priori.
4.5.1 Implementation of proposed frequency obfuscation technique
The proposed frequency obfuscation technique is implemented on C432. The resulting
power trace is shown in Fig 4.24. As can be seen, the power trace looks very diﬀerent from
that of the original trace for C432 in Fig 4.9 as it introduces random power consumption in
the time between two consecutive input patterns applied to C432. Because of this, it may
become more diﬃcult for the adversary to be able to identify when the ring oscillator-based
HTH is enabled and when it is not.
Figure 4.24: Power trace of C432 with proposed method
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Figure 4.25: Power trace of C432 with proposed method with HTH activated
As a result of implementing this technique, high-frequency components are introduced
to the power trace. Fig 4.25 shows the power trace of C432 with the proposed frequency
obfuscation method while also having the HTH enabled. When compared to Fig 4.24, the
power trace looks diﬀerent in the periods between the input patterns applied of the original
circuit, but it may be diﬃcult for an adversary to be able to tell when the Trojan is enabled
just by means of visual inspection. An adversary may try to then pass the power trace
through a high-pass ﬁlter, and the result of passing the power trace through an HPF is as
shown in Fig 4.26. Comparing this ﬁltered signal to point P for C432 shown in Fig 4.10, it
may still be diﬃcult for the adversary to be able to tell the diﬀerence between the eﬀects of
the ring oscillator from the eﬀects of random switching caused by the implementation of the
proposed obfuscation technique.
If an adversary tries to extract the value of point P from the ﬁltered signal, they may
assign bit values to each time period (4ns). Because there are high-frequency components
throughout the trace, an adversary may try to assign logic values to each time period in the
trace based on the observed amplitude of the ﬁltered signal. If the adversary considers the
lower 50% of amplitude as logic 0 and the higher 50% as logic 1, the bitstream generated for
the ﬁltered trace is as follows:
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Figure 4.26: Filtered power trace of C432 with proposed method with HTH activated
00110000000011111100000011110011111111111111111111000000111111000
In contrast, the value of point P observed by the HTH in C432 was denoted by the
bitstream:
11111111111111110011001111111111110011111111111111000000110011000
The bitstream obtained by analyzing the ﬁltered signal in our experiment is the not
same as the bitstream we obtained by observing the logic values of point P, and there is
approximately 34% mismatch in values. Note that the amplitude of the signal will depend
on the switching activity within the proposed frequency obfuscation technique, which is not
constant and the variation is greater than the switching activity added by the RO-based
HTH.
For further analysis, diﬀerent threshold levels were applied to the trace and the bitstream
for each was generated and compared with the actual values of point P. The chosen threshold
is given as a percentage of the maximum power consumption in the ﬁltered power trace. The
generated bitstream assumed a value of 0 if the power level was below the chosen threshold,
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Figure 4.27: Regression for diﬀerent thresholds in C432 with the proposed frequency
obfuscation technique and HTH activated
and the value of 1 represented the power level was above the chosen threshold. A graph
of the actual value vs the predicted value for point P was then plot and a trend line was
generated for the same. Fig 4.27 shows the regression plots for diﬀerent chosen thresholds.
The trend line is a line that indicates the general tendency of data. For a correlation of
100%, the predicted and actual values for the 1′s and 0′s in the bitstream should match
completely. If there is complete correlation, we would get a trend line with a positive slope
that would angle at 45◦ from the x-axis. This would be so because the actual and predicted
values for all the data points would be the same, and all the data points would thus either
lie at (1,1) or (0,0) in this case. The value of R2 is a representation of how closely ﬁt the
data is to the regression line. In the ideal situation, R2 would have a value of 1. If the R2
value is 1, it would mean that the attacker can successfully extract the correct values of the
observed point P by using the chosen threshold.
By observing the values of regression for each of the thresholds in Fig 4.27, we can say
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that there is little correlation between the actual value of point P and the predicted value of
point P for any of the chosen thresholds. The R2 values are very close to 0, which denotes
little correlation and poorly ﬁt data points. Comparing the ﬁve thresholds, a threshold of
50% was the most accurate in its representation of the logic values of point P with an error
rate of about 34%. Thus, the amplitude of the ﬁltered signal is more of a representation of
when the frequency obfuscation technique has more switching activity, rather than the state
of the ring oscillator-based HTH. Thus, the signal will be very noisy and will successfully
mitigate this type of HTH.
Figure 4.28: Power trace of C499 with proposed method
The same simulations were done using the second circuit, C499. Fig 4.28 shows the
power trace of C499 with normal operation while implementing the frequency obfuscation
technique. The input sequence is the same as the test inputs suggested by the HLM website.
Fig 4.29 represents the power trace of C499 with the HTH enabled, with the frequency
obfuscation technique implemented. Again, actual values of point P being observed here are
as shown in Fig 4.17
Just by means of visual inspection, an adversary may not be able to tell whether or not
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Figure 4.29: Power trace of C499 with proposed method with HTH activated
the ring oscillator is enabled as there are multiple frequency components in the power trace.
Fig 4.30 shows the power trace of C499 with frequency obfuscation and HTH activated,
passed through a high-pass ﬁlter. By means of visual inspection, it becomes clear that the
correlation between point P for C499 and Fig 4.30 is very little.
For aiding our analysis, we assigned bit values to every 4ns, with a threshold of 50%, in
the ﬁltered signal. The bitstream generated is as follows:
01001110011001011110000000011111101110101001000011011001110000110010011111110110000
In contrast, the actual bitstream for point P is:
00000100000000000000000000001001111111111111111111111111111101111111111111111111111
When compared to the original bitstream generated for point P, the new bitstream is
incorrect approximately 44% of the time.
Fig 4.31 shows the trend line, along with the coeﬃcient of determination for when diﬀerent
threshold values are assigned to generate the bitstream of the ﬁltered signal. Here, the
threshold is given as a percentage of the maximum amplitude of the ﬁltered signal.
By observing the values of regression for each of the thresholds, we can say that there is
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Figure 4.30: Filtered power trace of C499 with proposed method with HTH activated
Figure 4.31: Regression for diﬀerent thresholds in C499 with the proposed frequency
obfuscation technique and HTH activated
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little correlation between the actual value of point P, as determined by its bitstream, and
the bitstream generated by assigning threshold values to the C499 circuit protected with the
proposed frequency obfuscation technique. In fact, for a threshold of 20%, the regression
coeﬃcient has a value of 0. This means that there are as many values that represent the
predicted value of point P correctly, as there are values that represent the value of point P
incorrectly. In contrast, the R2 value for a threshold of 40% is the best representation of
point P as the R2 value is the highest at 0.0458, and the error rate is 38.8%. However, this
is still very poor correlation.
Hence, with the experiments for the two ISCAS circuits, C432 and C499, it becomes clear
that by the implementation of the proposed frequency obfuscation technique makes it more
diﬃcult for an adversary to extract data from frequency analysis of the power trace.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we employed SDDL as a DPA-mitigation technique and showed that al-
though DPA-mitigation may make it more diﬃcult for adversaries to perform DPA attacks
and extract internal circuit information, there is a work-around for this. The adversary may
introduce the proposed HTH to leak information on the logic state of a point P in the circuit
through the power trace. Additionally, this type of HTH need not be used in isolation. If an
adversary is able to use this HTH to observe one or more key bits in an encryption circuit,
it could also be used by attackers to make DPA attacks easier to implement by making it
easier to generate the key hypothesis.
As shown in Chapter 4, extracting information regarding the logic value at point P
by extracting the power trace and performing frequency analysis was implemented and was
accurate in the data that it leaked. This type of HTH works because the oscillation frequency
of the HTH is much faster than that of the clock. However, if there are other high-frequency
components in the circuit, the HTH may not work so well.
In order to counter the eﬀect of this HTH, we also suggested implementing a diﬀerent
type of technique for obscuring the power trace in such a way that any frequency-based
analyses will not work. This method consisted of a circuit design that introduced greater
variability into the power trace than that added by the Trojan. After simulation, we came
to the conclusion that this method successfully made leakage of information regarding the
value at point P through the frequency analysis of the power side channel more diﬃcult. It
did so by introducing other high-frequency components to the circuit.
Thus, in summary, we have implemented the HTH and veriﬁed its functionality and
eﬀects on the power trace. We also implemented a DPA-mitigation technique and veriﬁed
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the HTH's functionality in the presence of that technique. We have also designed a frequency
obscuring circuit that would help prevent the attacker from obtaining data regarding the
value of point P through frequency analysis of the power trace.
5.2 Future Work
Future work will focus on further investigating the eﬀects of the proposed power obscuring
technique, along with analyzing how eﬀective implementing it may be in terms of power, area
and cost constraints. The eﬀects of including multiple blocks of the proposed circuitry can be
studied in detail in terms of how it aﬀects the frequency spectrum. One can also implement
this technique in tandem with the other pre-existing DPA-mitigation techniques to verify its
eﬀectiveness. Other techniques for prevention of information leakage through frequency side
channel can also be investigated.
Additionally, the proposed frequency obscuring technique needs to be veriﬁed in more
circuits, speciﬁcally diﬀerent kinds of circuits. This will provide more information regarding
the applicability of the proposed approach.
Future work will also include analyzing how the HTH will work in the presence of other
high-frequency components, as well as other HTHs, and if the HTH can be physically im-
plemented to use part of a RON chain or a pre-existing on-chip ring oscillator without being
detected during test.
Future work will also focus on analyzing the eﬀects of the trigger in a larger circuit, in
isolation, as will as in the presence of a ring oscillator network (RON). Future work will also
focus on developing an improved trigger for the HTH that consumes very little power.
Finally, the analysis in this thesis was performed entirely in simulation. Future work can
investigate the amount of data that can be detected when ring oscillators are implemented
in physical chips and measured with physical test equipment.
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